Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
Volume 20
Issue 2 March 1987

Article 4

1987

Economic Sanctions and International Terrorism
Kenneth W. Abbott

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Kenneth W. Abbott, Economic Sanctions and International Terrorism, 20 Vanderbilt Law Review 289
(2021)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol20/iss2/4

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For
more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

Economic Sanctions and International

Terrorism
Kenneth W. Abbott*
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.
II.

III.
IV.

INTRODUCTION ..................................

289

STATE INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORISM ...............
RATIONALES FOR ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ............
THE RATIONALES FOR SANCTIONS APPLIED .........

293

A.
B.
C.
D.

304
306
314
319
324

Economic Warfare ..........................
Imposing Costs .............................
Denial of Means ............................
Symbolic Communication .....................
V. CONCLUSION ....................................
I.

300

304

INTRODUCTION

Economic sanctions have become a prominent part of the American
response to foreign state involvement in international terrorism.' Since
the early 1970s,2 a series of Congressional statutes3 has authorized or
required the Executive to curtail a broad range of economic relationships
with countries the Secretary of State has determined to be supporters of
terrorism, a group that now includes Libya, Syria, South Yemen, Iran
and Cuba4 and earlier included Iraq.5 Under these statutes, the United
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law; Harvard Law School,

1969; B.A., Cornell University, 1966.
1. United States Department of State, Economic Sanctions to Combat International
Terrorism, Bureau of Public Affairs Special Report No. 149, July 1986, at 1 [hereinafter State Department Report].
2. For a discussion of the early history of these statutes, see Abbott, Linking Trade

to PoliticalGoals: Foreign Policy Export Controls in the 1970s and 1980s, 65

MINN.

L. REV. 739, 766-71 (1981).
3. For a thorough review of these statutes and others relating to the President's ability to use economic sanctions, see B. CARTER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS:
IMPROVING THE HAPHAZARD U.S. LEGAL REGIME (forthcoming); see also State Department Report, supra note 1, at 3-5.
4. Export Administration Act, § 60)(1), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(,)(1) (1982), requires
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States has restricted all forms of foreign assistance,' Eximbank and
OPIC financing,7 arms sales," commercial exports9 and imports, 0 trade
preferences," air transportation1 2 and other transactions13 with one or

the Executive branch to notify specific Congressional committees before granting licenses
for certain exports to countries that the Secretary of State has determined "repeatedly"
provide support for acts of terrorism. The Export Administration Regulations reflect the
Secretary's determination. See 15 C.F.R. §§ 385.1(b)(1) (Cuba), 385.4(d) (People's
Democratic Republic of Yemen, Syria, and Iran), 385.7(b) (Libya) (1987).
5. The Secretary of State removed Iraq from the list of states supporting terrorism,
and hence from the related restrictions under the Export Administration Regulations in
1982 because of its "improved record." See 47 Fed. Reg. 9201, 9204 (1982).
6. See 22 U.S.C. § 2371 (1982), prohibiting the granting of the specified forms of
foreign assistance to any country that the President determines (1) grants sanctuary from
prosecution to any individual or group that has committed an act of international terrorism, or (2) otherwise supports international terrorism. The restriction applies to all
forms of assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act, the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, the Arms Export Control Act, the Export-Import Bank
Act and the Peace Corps Act. The President can waive the restriction on national security and humanitarian grounds. See also Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-190, § 512, 99 Stat. 1291, 1304 (1985) (prohibits use of appropriated funds for aid to Cuba, Iraq, Libya, South Yemen, and Syria).
7. 22 U.S.C. § 2371 (1982) specifically restricts assistance under the Export-Import
Bank Act; the Foreign Assistance Act, supra note 6, to which the section also applies,
authorizes OPIC activities. As to Eximbank, see also 12 U.S.C. § 635(b)(1)(B) (1982)
(authorizing denial of Eximbank financing for specified foreign policy reasons, including
support of terrorism).
8. See infra notes 150-55 and accompanying text. The Arms Export Control Act
prohibits the export of items on the Munitions List to countries supporting international
terrorism. See State Department Report, supra note 1, at 3.
9. See infra note 137. See also 22 U.S.C. § 2349aa-8(b) (1982) (authorizing President to prohibit export to Libya of any good or technology subject to jurisdiction of the
United States or exported by any person subject to jurisdiction of the United States).
10. See 22 U.S.C. § 2349aa-9(a) (1982) (authorizing President to ban imports of any
good or service from any country that supports terrorism or terrorist organizations or
harbors terrorists or terrorist organizations). See also id. at § 2349aa-8(a) (authorizing
President to prohibit the importation into the United States of any article grown, produced, extracted or manufactured in Libya).
11. See 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(6) (1982) (prohibiting designation of any nation supporting terrorism as beneficiary developing country under Generalized System of Preferences, with exception for national economic interest of the United States).
12. See 49 U.S.C. § 1514 (1982) (authorizing President to suspend air service to any
country he determines to be violating Hague air safety convention or supporting any
terrorist group that supports the seizure of aircraft, regardless of bilateral air service
agreements, and to any third state that maintains air service to such a country); 49
U.S.C. § 1515(e)(2)(D) (1982) (authorizing, and in some cases requiring, President to
restrict air service to foreign airports that do not provide adequate security and to third
country airports that continue to serve such airports). See also id. at § 1515a(b). The
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more of the designated states.
The use of such measures has grown apace in recent years. The
United States has steadily tightened economic sanctions aimed at Libya
in particular over the last decade. This process culminated in President
Reagan's national emergency declaration of January 198614 which prohibited virtually all economic transactions with Libya and froze Libyan
assets subject to United States jurisdiction.1 5 The United States also
strengthened sanctions against Syria in November 1986 and June 1987,
although to a much lesser extent,"6 and tightened controls on exports to

State Department takes the position that the Federal Aviation Act also "contains sufficient authority" for the Department of Transportation to prohibit sales in the United
States of airline tickets to countries against which the President has imposed aviation
sanctions. See State Department Report, supra note 1, at 4.
13. Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 170106 (1982) [hereinafter IEEPA], upon declaring a national emergency based on the existence of "any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the [United States] national security, foreign
policy, or economy," the President may interrupt virtually any economic transaction with
foreign persons. Id. at § 1701(a). In January 1986, for example, President Reagan imposed economic sanctions on Libya under the IEEPA. Those sanctions included a ban on
exports and imports, a prohibition on new private loans and credits, financial controls
designed to restrict travel to Libya and the blocking of certain Libyan assets in the control of United States persons. See infra notes 14-15.
Statute requires the United States representative to the International Monetary Fund
[hereinafter IMF] to oppose IMF assistance to countries harboring terrorists. 22 U.S.C.
§ 286e-11 (1982).
14. Exec. Order No. 12,543, 51 Fed. Reg. 865 (1986).
15. Libyan Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 550 (Treasury Department regulations prohibiting exports, imports, transportation and travel to and from Libya, performance of contracts supporting projects in Libya and extensions of credit to the government
of Libya and blocking assets of the government of Libya within the United States or
under the control of United States persons); Exec. Order No. 12,544, 51 Fed. Reg. 1235
(1986) (ordering blocking of assets); 15 C.F.R. §§ 385.7, 390.7 (1987) (Commerce Department regulations revoking export authorizations inconsistent with Libyan Sanctions
Regulations); In re Suspension of Operations Between United States and Libya, Order
86-2-23, Doc. No. 43,711 (Department of Transportation, 1986), reprinted in H.R.
Doc. No. 249, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). For a thorough discussion of the Libyan

sanctions, see Bialos & Juster, The Libyan Sanctions: A Rational Response to StateSponsored Terrorism, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 799 (1986).
Just over two months later, of course, the United States went beyond economic sanctions, using military force against Libya. For a collection of documents relating to the
bombing, see DEP'T ST. BULL., June 1986, at 1-23.
16. For a description of the sanctions the United States imposed in 1986, see U.S.
Takes Measures Against Syria, White House Statement, Nov. 14, 1986, reprinted in
DEP'T ST. BULL., Jan. 1987, at 79 [hereinafter White House Statement]. The actions
taken included a decision to expand certain export controls, termination of Eximbank
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Iran in 1984.17 For the most part, however, these have been unilateral
American measures; international cooperation has been extremely
modest."'
Understanding and evaluating antiterrorism sanctions is no easy task.
Terrorism and state support for terrorism are complex, sometimes am-

biguous phenomena. Economic sanctions can also be complex and subtle
instruments.1 9 Sanctions against terrorism, then, involve complexity com-

financing, see 51 Fed. Reg. 43,796 (1986), notification of intention to terminate the
United States-Syria air service agreement, a prohibition on the sale of tickets in the
United States for transportation by Syrian Arab Airlines, advice to United States oil
companies that continued Syrian oil operations would be inappropriate, more vigorous
visa procedures, a stronger travel advisory relating to Syria and certain diplomatic sanctions. DEP'T ST. BULL., Jan. 1987, at 79.
Congress did not expand the export controls that the White House statement mentioned until June 1987. 52 Fed. Reg. 23,167 (June 18, 1987). At that time, the United
States required validated licenses for exports to Syria of all goods and technical data
controlled for national security purposes and all aircraft, helicopters and related components regardless of the identity of the purchaser or the size of the transaction. The Commerce Department also made certain outstanding licenses invalid for exports to Syria. Id.
For a description of the restrictions previously in effect, see infra notes 198-214 and
accompanying text.
Under the 1987 Regulations, the government will generally deny validated license applications, but it will give favorable consideration, on a case-by-case basis, to several
categories of newly controlled transactions including transactions under prior contracts,
re-export of certain previously exported goods not originally destined for Syria, exports
of foreign-produced goods with a United States-origin content of 20% or less by value
and sales of medical equipment. 52 Fed. Reg. 23,167, 23,168 (June 18, 1987), (renumbering 15 C.F.R. § 385.4(d)(4) as § 385.4(d)(5) and adding a new § 385.4(d)(4)).
17. It extended controls on exports of aircraft and helicopters to smaller and less
costly models. The government also extended antiterrorism restrictions on items whose
export it had restricted for national security reasons to lower value shipments and placed
controls on the export of certain outboard marine engines. Under the licensing policy
announced at the same time, the United States generally denies licenses for all the controlled items with narrow exceptions for certain preexisting contracts and for foreignproduced goods with low United States content. See 15 C.F.R. § 385.4(d) (1987).
18. See State Department Report, supra note 1, at 2-3. European countries have
agreed to participate in narrower sanctions, such as restrictions on arms sales to Libya,
and have represented that they would endeavor to prevent their firms from replacing
United States firms as suppliers to Libya and other target states. See 15 C.F.R. §
385.4(d); Statement of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Twelve Meeting in Brussels
on Combating International Terrorism, Jan. 27, 1986, reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 208, 209
(1986).
19. For a discussion of economic sanctions as both instruments of coercion and devices for symbolically communicating varied messages to multiple audiences, see Abbott,

Coercion and Communication: Frameworks for Evaluation of Economic Sanctions,
N.Y.U. INVTL L. & POL. (forthcoming).
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pounded by complexity.
In this Article I hope to take at least a step toward clarifying these
matters by presenting a framework for the analysis of antiterrorism
sanctions and using that framework to discuss several of the sanctions
that the United States currently employs.
Parts Two and Three of this Article set out the elements of the framework. Part Two begins by describing the varying forms or levels of state
involvement in terrorism,20 shown graphically in Figure 12 All forms of
state involvement are not alike, at least analytically, and Part Two will
discuss the appropriateness of employing sanctions or other measures of
influence against different levels of involvement. Part Three will describe
in general terms, without reference to the problem of terrorism, the four
principal rationales for the use of economic sanctions.2 2 Figure 2 depicts
these rationales.23
Part Four of this Article will then join these two elements together,24
producing the matrix shown in Figure 3.25 The levels of state involvement appear on the horizontal axis of this matrix and the rationales for
sanctions appear on the vertical axis. Part Four will sketch the application of the four sanctions rationales to state involvement in terrorism-the four rows of the matrix-and illustrate their application with
examples from current American sanctions.
II.

STATE INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORISM

As Figure 1 shows, one can picture state involvement in terrorism as
running along a continuum, from the absence of state support at the left,
to the most direct and extensive forms of involvement at the right. For
analytical purposes, I have divided this continuum into three discrete sections representing three distinct levels of involvement, although the
boundaries between these sections are difficult to draw with precision.
At the first level independent terrorist groups, which Robert Kupperman describes as "self-sustaining organisms,"2 6 operate without significant state involvement. They may move from state to state or operate
from some jurisdictional no-man's land, such as portions of Lebanon. If

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
32-33

See infra notes 26-37 and accompanying text.
See infra Appendix p. 326.
See infra notes 57-79 and accompanying text.
See infra Appendix p. 327.
See infra notes 80-220 and accompanying text.
See infra Appendix p. 328.
Kupperman, Terror, the Strategic Tool: Response and Control, 463 ANNALS 24,
(1982).
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they operate from a single state, state officials may not know of them or
may actively oppose them but be unable to deal with them effectively.
At the second level states provide "support" to otherwise independent
terrorist groups. This support can take a wide variety of forms. At the
boundary between the first and second levels it may amount to nothing
more than toleration of the presence of terrorist groups within a state.
Somewhat more affirmatively, it may take the form of moral or verbal
support. Support may include sanctuary following a terrorist act. Toward the right-hand boundary, it may consist of more active ex ante
assistance such as training, the provision of passports, arms, and intelligence information, logistical assistance and similar forms of support.
At the third level states "sponsor" terrorism: they incite groups or individuals to commit terrorist acts, direct acts of terrorism, recruit terrorists for their own programs and carry out terrorist acts through their
own agents.
In the real world it will often be difficult to place a state's activities
precisely on this scale because of the difficulty of obtaining adequate,
reliable information. This problem is common to many areas of international relations but is particularly acute here because of the secrecy with
which states customarily clothe their involvement in terrorism. 27 This
lack of information forces American officials to speak vaguely of a state's
links or connections to terrorism, 28 for example, and even to take action
without knowing the precise level of state involvement. 29 In theory, however, the three levels of state involvement in terrorism call for different
kinds of analysis and may also call for different measures, at least in
degree.
In all three settings it is individuals who carry out acts of terrorism.
27. See Axelrod & Keohane, Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and
UNDER ANARCHY 226, 235 (K. Oye, ed. 1986); Bialos &
Juster, supra note 15, at 840-41; Wilkinson, State-Sponsored InternationalTerrorism:
The Problems of Response, 40 WORLD TODAY 292, 294 (1984) (states supporting terrorism act clandestinely and deny responsibility); Terrorism: Oversight Hearings before
the Subcomm. on Civil and ConstitutionalRights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
99th Cong., 1st and 2nd Sess. 3, 5 (1986) [hereinafter Terrorism: Oversight Hearings]
(testimony of Win. Quandt, Brookings Institute) (any state supporting terrorism will try
to "cover its tracks").
28. See Terrorism: Oversight Hearings,supra note 27, at 42, 44 (testimony of Prof.
Martha Crenshaw, Wesleyan Univ.); Press Conference of John Whitehead, Deputy Secretary of State, Jan. 27, 1986, reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 209, 214-18 (1986).
29. At the time of the Libya embargo, the United States government apparently had
only general evidence of Libyan support and sanctuary for the terrorists involved in the
Rome and Vienna airport shooting incidents. Later, evidence emerged linking Libya
more directly with those incidents. See Bialos & Juster, supra note 15, at 807 n.30.

Institutions, in COOPERATION
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Whatever the level of state involvement, improving the mechanisms for
capturing, trying and punishing individual terrorists, largely in the hope
of deterring otheis, is an important strategy. Most of the legal developments in the fight against terrorism-notably the several multilateral antiterrorism conventions, which require signatory states to take custody of
persons accused of specified terrorist acts and either extradite them or
submit them to the appropriate authorities for prosecution-are part of
this strategy. 0 When terrorist groups are acting independently of state
involvement, it is one of the few strategies available.3 1

30. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, arts. 6, 8, G.A. Res.
146, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 39), U.N. Doc. A/C.6/34/L.23 (1970), reprinted in
18 I.L.M. 1456 (1979); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes
Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973,
28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532, G.A. Res. 3166, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at
146, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3166 (1974), reprintedin 13 I.L.M. 41 (1974), arts. 6-7; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, arts. 6-7, 22
U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192, reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 133 (1971); Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, arts.
6-7, 24 U.S.T. 565, T.I.A.S. No. 7570, reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 1151 (1971). See also
Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14,
1983, art. 16, 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768, reprinted in 2 I.L.M. 1042 (1963).
These conventions also call for cooperation in law enforcement: exchanges of information, coordination of administrative measures and assistance in criminal proceedings. For
descriptions of the antiterrorism conventions and other legal developments, see Murphy,
Legal Controls and the Deterrence of Terrorism: Performance and Prospects, 13
RUTGERS L.J. 465 (1982); Murphy, Recent InternationalLegal Developments in Controlling Terrorism, 4 CHINESE Y.B. INT'L L. & AFF. 97 (1984). See also General Assembly Resolution on Measures to Prevent International Terrorism, G.A. Res. 61, 40
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
.), U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/61 (1986) reprinted in
25 I.L.M. 239 (1986); Tokyo Economic Summit Statement on Terrorism, May 5, 1986,
reprinted in DEP'T ST. BULL. (July 1986), at 5; Venice Economic Summit Statement on
Terrorism, N.Y. Times, June 10, 1987, at 6, col. 1.
31. Another strategy is a defensive strategy, based on measures like improving airport security. The multilateral antiterrorism conventions require signatory states to take
precautions within their respective territories against the particular forms of terrorism
that the conventions address. See Murphy, Recent InternationalLegal Developments in
Controlling Terrorism, supra note 30, at 100-01.
The General Assembly Resolution on Measures to Prevent International Terrorism,
see supra note 30, at paras. 11-13, calls upon states to take measures that the International Civil Aviation Organization [hereinafter ICAO] has recommended and provided
for in the conventions to protect civil aviation and other forms of public transport, urges
the ICAO to continue its efforts and requests the International Maritime Organization to
study the problem of terrorism on ships with a view to recommending protective
measures.
The Tokyo Economic Summit statement commits the "Summit Seven" countries to
certain defensive measures, including limiting the size of diplomatic and consular mis-
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State sponsored terrorism, at the other extreme, is quite a different
matter. If Libya orders its agents to bomb American facilities, for example,32 it is acting as the principal in the transaction; the individual terrorists planting explosives at its direction are mere agents. The state is
initiating terrorist acts that would not otherwise have taken place. Its
orders, along with the practical assistance it provides, are the proximate
cause of any damage that results. A state in that position is, in short, the
primary wrongdoer. The state has acted, moreover, with specific willful
intent. It is clearly appropriate for the international community to hold
such a state responsible for its actions and to search for strategies that
will punish, deter or otherwise change its behavior.
State support, the range of state involvement between mere toleration
and extensive involvement just short of outright sponsorship, presents the
most interesting situation. At the upper end of the range the boundary
between support and sponsorship is indistinct. According to United
States sources, for example, from the mid-1970s through 1983,
Syria-one of the "charter members" of the State Department's terrorism list-managed numerous terrorist acts directly, using its own personnel. This is a clear case of sponsorship. 3 In 1986 the British trial of
Nizar Hindawi again exposed direct Syrian sponsorship3 4 and led to
strengthened American sanctions. 5 Between those dates, however, Syria
turned to a different strategy, one of supporting independent terrorist
groups that shared its own aims, like the group led by Abu Nidal, in

sions of terrorist-supporting states, tightening visa requirements for persons travelling
from such states and denying entry to persons expelled from another state because of
conviction for or suspicion of terrorist offenses. See Tokyo Economic Summit Statement
on Terrorism, supra note 30.
The Council of Europe called for similar steps in November 1986, with the support of
the United States. See DEP'T ST. BULL. 79 (Jan. 1987).
Another possible strategy is to restrict the availability of certain kinds of weapons so
that terrorist groups cannot obtain them. The Western nations have cooperated in controlling access to nuclear material pursuant to this strategy. See Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Oct. 26, 1979, reprintedin 18 I.L.M. 1419, 1422-31
(1979).
32. According to the United States, Libya in 1986 ordered its embassy staffs in several countries to conduct terrorist attacks on American facilities. See Address of Robert
Oakley, Acting Ambassador at Large for Counter-Terrorism, to U.S. Conference of
Mayors, June 16, 1986, reprinted in DEP'T ST. BULL., Aug. 1986, at 1, 2.
33. See Syrian Support for International Terrorism: 1983-86, DEP'T ST. BULL.,
Feb. 1987, at 73.
34. See id. at 73-74.
35. See supra note 16.
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order to make its own participation easier to deny.36 In terms of intent,
at least, such support is indistinguishable from outright sponsorship.
In other respects, however, the individual terrorists receiving state
support remain the primary wrongdoers, and the involvement of the supporting state is secondary. The supporting state may supply a terrorist
group with passports, sanctuary or even arms, but it is not directly involved in the terrorist actions that such a group may perpetrate. In terms
of initiative and causation, too, the supporting state may make a lesser
contribution than the sponsoring state since the terrorists would be trying to carry out the acts of terrorism even without the supporting state's
assistance.
In addition, by contrast to the Syrian example, the supporting state
may well have a lesser degree of intent than the sponsoring state. A state
may lend its support to a terrorist group out of a desire to gain political
favor with other supporting states or out of general sympathy with a
cause; it may know the likely consequences of its aid but lack the willful
intent of the sponsoring state.37 A state may also lend its support out of
fear. At the lower end of the range, a state may even provide sanctuary
to terrorist groups out of simple negligence.
Through most of the range, then, one can characterize the terroristsupporting state, with its secondary involvement, as a "gatekeeper," a
party whose cooperation makes wrongdoing by others possible, or at
least easier." Simple domestic analogues include the bartender who
serves liquor to an almost-drunken driver and the accountant who provides a clean report on a fraudulent deal." In domestic society we sometimes impose legal restraints and expend scarce enforcement resources on
gatekeepers like these as well as on primary wrongdoers. In other situations, however, we disregard the activities of gatekeepers because of the
additional costs and practical problems of secondary enforcement or because secondary enforcement seems unlikely to prevent much additional
wrongdoing.4 ° The economic theory of gatekeeper liability attempts to
explain when secondary enforcement is called for and when it is likely to
be successful;4 1 one can usefully apply this theory to the treatment of
terrorist-supporting states.
36. See Syrian Support for International Terrorism, supra note 33, at 73.
37.

Even Syria, it seems, was not aware of all the actions of the Abu Nidal group.

See Syrian Supportfor International Terrorism, supra note 33, at 74.
38. See Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J. L., ECON. & ORG. 53, 53-54 (1986).
39. See id. at 63-65.
40. See id. at 54, 66, 87-88, 93.

41. See id.
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In general, secondary enforcement is necessary only when direct deterrence of primary wrongdoers-the normal method of controlling wrongdoing-is insufficient to reduce wrongdoing to an acceptable level."2 Terrorism poses substantial difficulties for primary deterrence. First, because
of their tactics, terrorists are often hard to identify and apprehend.4 Second, the penalties terrorists face, discounted by the odds of capture, may
not appear severe." Despite considerable effort, the international community has not yet created an institutional framework-an international
criminal court or even a strong network of extradition treaties-guaranteeing that states will prosecute an accused terrorist who
they apprehend.4 5 Terrorists can discount the nominal penalties even
further. Finally, even if prosecution were certain and the penalty were
death, the rational calculation of penalties would not deter some fanatic
terrorists, like the fedayeen, the self-sacrificers.4 6 If the international

42. See id. at 56.
43. See Bremer, PracticalMeasuresfor Dealingwith Terrorism, DEP'T ST. BULL.,
Mar. 1987, at 1, 1-2; Secretary of State Shultz, Low-Intensity Warfare: The Challenge
of Ambiguity, U.S. Dep't of State Current Policy No. 783, reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 204,
205 (1986) ("Despite . . . the widespread recognition that their acts are criminal, few
terrorists are caught, and fewer still are punished to the full extent they deserve.")
44. Direct deterrence assumes that a wrongdoer acts as if he were calculating the
expected net return of wrongdoing, that is, the expected benefit of the wrongdoing to him
less the costs of the wrongdoing and any expected penalty. The expected penalty is the
punishment the wrongdoer is likely to incur multiplied by the probability that he will be
captured, tried, convicted and subjected to punishment. See Kraakman, supra note 38, at
56; R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 164-65 (2d ed. 1977). The difficulty of
detecting wrongdoing and procuring the conviction and punishment of wrongdoers are
common problems in efforts to increase expected penalties and thus strengthen deterrence. See Kraakman, supra note 38, at 57.
45. Not all states adhere to the multilateral "extradite or submit to prosecution"
conventions discussed above, see supra note 30, and these conventions cover only certain
specific forms of terrorism. For an important regional convention designed to improve the
process of extraditing terrorists, see European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, T.S. 90, reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 1272 (1976). See also Supplementary Extradition
Treaty, U.S.-U.K., Treaty Doc. 99-8, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1985, in force 1986. In John
Murphy's words, all of the relevant conventions together constitute a "grossly inadequate
response to international terrorism." Murphy, Recent International Legal Developments, supra note 30, at 109. Further, many governments contrive to let accused terrorists go free, with or without trial despite their obligations under the various conventions. See Pierre, Politics of International Terrorism, 19 ORBIS 1251, 1264-65 (1976);
Liskofsky, The Abu Daoud Case: Law or Politics, 7 Is. Y.B. H. RGTS. 66 (1977).
46. See Pierre, supra note 45, at 1254. In the normal analysis of deterrence, the
equivalent problem involves persons whose judgment is impaired, so that they cannot
make a rational calculation of expected net benefit or cost. See Kraakman, supra note 38,
at 56.
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community cannot solve these problems-and they are not easily
solved-and if that community still perceives the level of terrorism as
unacceptably high,' 7 secondary enforcement may be necessary.
We normally turn to secondary enforcement, however, only when private incentives are insufficient to restrain gatekeepers from helping
wrongdoers without the investment of additional social resources.4
Many observers believe, for example, that most lawyers and accountants
voluntarily guard against participating in fraudulent acts by their clients
in order to protect their own valuable reputations.4 9
For most countries, similarly, the desire to avoid a reputation as a
supporter of terrorism-a reputation that might harm their chances of
entering into desirable relationships-provides a sufficient incentive. 50
For a few states, however, this incentive is irrelevant, or at least insufficient, and a few states are all it takes to support a significant level of
terrorism.
If secondary enforcement were thought desirable, it could, in theory,
take the form of positive sanctions such as rewards for withholding support from terrorist groups. It is difficult, however, to determine when a
state has in fact withheld its support. It is easier, in spite of the pervasive
information problems,5 1 to tell when a state has failed to prevent wrongdoing 52 and to respond accordingly.
Based on considerations like these, the international community has
moved to impose a form of secondary liability, at least implicitly to be
enforced by negative sanctions, on terrorist-supporting states as well as
on terrorist-sponsoring states. It has done so most clearly in the Declara-

47. Most commentators on terrorism support such a perception and call for stronger
measures. A few commentators, however, argue that the present level of terrorism is
bearable and that additional measures, especially the use of military force, would be an
overreaction. See, e.g., Terrorism, Oversight Hearings, supra note 27, at 49-50 (statement of Prof. Martha Crenshaw); Jenkins, Statements About Terrorism, 463 ANNALS
11, 12-16 (1982).
48. See Kraakman, supra note 38, at 54, 60-62.
49. See id.
50. Many international relations scholars argue that concern for reputation, especially a reputation for adhering to agreements and conforming to community norms, is a
major influence on the conduct of states. Even states that would not conform to a norm
for ethical reasons may do so for the self-interested reason that other states may be less
likely to enter into agreements or other relations with them in the future if they acquire
reputations for flouting community norms. For a discussion of the influence of reputa-

tion, see R.

KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE

WORLD POLrrICAL ECONOMY

51.

105-06 (1984).

See supra note 26.

52. See Kraakman, supra note 38, at 60.
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tion on Friendly Relations,"3 adopted by consensus in the United Nations General Assembly in 1970, as an elaboration on the obligation of
states to refrain from the use of force against the terroritorial integrity or
political independence of other states or in any other manner inconsistent
with the purposes of the United Nations under its Charter." The Declaration addresses sponsorship by imposing a duty to refrain from organizing, instigating and participating in forceful terrorist acts in another
state. It also addresses support by imposing a duty to refrain from assisting such acts, It even reaches to the lower end of the support category by
articulating a duty to refrain from acquiescing in the use of a state's
territory for organized activities directed toward the commission of terrorist acts abroad. 55
At least in the case of state support for terrorism, though, these broad
duties ignore certain additional questions that the theory of secondary
enforcement tells us we should ask. The two" most important questions
are: (1) to what extent will secondary enforcement be effective in reducing wrongdoing and (2) will any such reduction be worth the additional
costs?5" With the legal obligations already established, states will or
should face these questions when they consider imposing economic
sanctions.
III.

RATIONALES FOR ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

Figure 2 shows the four most important rationales for the use of economic sanctions arranged from the most broadly coercive-economic
53.

Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations

and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
Oct. 24, 1970, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/
8028 (1971), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 1292 (1970) [hereinafter Declaration]. See Paust,

Responding Lawfully to International Terrorism: The Use of Force Abroad, 8 WHITTIER L. REv. 711, 714-16 (1986). The Tokyo Economic Summit statement reaffirms the
condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and those, including governments, who sponsor

and support it. Tokyo Economic Summit Statement on Terrorism, supra note 30.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
55. The section of the Declaration that elaborates on the principle of nonintervention
in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of other states also provides: "no state shall
organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities
directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State . . . ...
Declaration, supra note 53, at 1295. It is unclear whether giving sanctuary to terrorists following completion of a terrorist act abroad would alone constitute a violation of the duties
stated in the Declaration. For a discussion of state responsibility for terrorist acts, see
54.

Lillich & Paxman, State Responsibilityfor Injuries to Aliens Occasioned by Terrorist
Activities, 26 AM. U. L. REV. 217 (1977).
56. See Kraakman, supra note 38, at 61.
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warfare and imposing costs-to the most selective and subtle-denial of
means and symbolic communication.
Economic warfare is normally a supplement to or a substitute for actual combat; the strategy was highly developed during the two World
Wars.5 7 This rationale assumes that the "enemy" will need extensive
resources for combat, as in a protracted conventional war,. and that it
will divert any resources that its civilian economy saves by engaging in
trade or other international transactions, at least in part, to strengthen its
military capacity.5" The logic of the theory would support a total embargo, since all economic transactions produce gains from trade. More
commonly, however, the theory provides the rationale for controls on
transactions particularly important to the enemy's economy-bottleneck
transactions-whether directly related to its military sector or not.59
Imposing costs, or the strategy of leverage,60 is the most familiar rationale for economic sanctions."1 Under this theory, the sanctioning state
links its trade, foreign assistance, arms sales and other international economic transactions to changes in the target state's behavior: if the target
acts in ways the sanctioning state does not approve of-by supporting
terrorist activities, for example-the sanctioning state suspends those
transactions, imposing costs on the target's economy (as well, of course,
as on its own); if the target's behavior improves, the sanctioning state
permits such transactions to resume.62 The theory assumes that the target state will rationally balance the benefits of its current policies against
the discounted costs of subsequent retaliation and conclude that a change
in policy is in its own interests. 3
This is essentially the same theory of rational deterrence that underlies many sanctions against individual offenders in domestic society."
The aim of imposing costs is not to reduce the target state's capabilities,
57. See Mastanduno, Strategies of Economic Containment: U.S. Trade Relations
with the Soviet Union, 37 WORLD POL. 503, 506-10 (1985); Gilpin, Structural Constraints on Economic Leverage: Market-Type Systems, in STRATEGIC DIMENSIONS OF
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR at 105-06 (G. McCormick & R. Bissell eds. 1984).

58.
59.
60.

See Mastanduno, supra note 57, at 507-08.
See id. at 509-10.
See G. HUFBAUER & J. SCHorr, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED: HisTORY AND CURRENT POLICY 2 (1985); Gilpin, supra note 57, at 105-06.
61. See Gilpin, supra note 57; Abbott, supra note 2, at 798-800; G. HUFBAUER & J.
SCHOTr, supra note 60. For a discussion of the Hufbauer & Schott analysis as an exam-

ple of the "imposing costs" rationale, see Abbott, supra note 19.
62. See Mastanduno, supra note 57, at 514-15; Abbott, supra note 2, at 799-800
(discussing views of Samuel P. Huntington).

63.
64.

See Abbott, supra note 2, at 798-99.
See supra text accompanying note 40.
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as in economic warfare, but to affect its intention or will to engage in
particular conduct.0 5 If the sanctioning state is unable to force a change
in the target state's conduct, it can at least exact a price for defying its
demands.6 6 The strategy is closely related to the doctrine of countermeasures-retorsion and reprisal-in international law, one of the important
ways in which states enforce legal obligations in the decentralized international system.67
Denial of means, like economic warfare, is designed to reduce a target
state's capabilities, but in a much more limited and selective way. The
denial of means rationale typically leads to restrictions on exports or
other transactions that directly contribute to a particular disfavored activity.68 The best example of this technique is the strategic embargo that
the United States and other Western nations maintain against the Soviet
Union." The embargo is designed to prevent the Soviets from obtaining
selected items that would contribute directly and substantially to their
military capabilities: arms and a variety of other high technology civilian
items with military applications, so-called dual use items. 0 On the same
rationale, the United States restricts the export of crime control equipment-which some commentators refer to as "citizen control equipment" 7 1-to nations that violate human rights7 2 and the export of certain

65. See Mastanduno, supra note 57, at 514-15; Gilpin, supra note 57, at 105-06.
66. See Knorr, Economic Relations as an Instrument of National Power, in STRATEGIC DIMENSIONS- OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, supra note 57, at 183, 200 (imposing
costs may make target state more likely to comply with future demands); D. BALDWIN,
ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 132-33 (1985) (imposing costs on target state is form of influence, even if target does not change policy).
67. See infra note 103. States employ coercive economic measures in all sorts of interstate relations, not only in response to violations of international norms. Despite efforts to declare such measures unlawful aggression or use of force, the international community appears prepared to accept a considerable amount of economic coercion as
inevitable. See generally Editorial Comment, Political and Economic Coercion in Contemporary InternationalLaw, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 405 (1985).
68. See Knorr, supra note 66, at 190-94; Mastanduno, supra note 57, at 510.
Kraakman describes this strategy in general terms as involving "efforts to regulate activities or inputs that are precursors to misconduct." Kraakman, supra note 38, at 57.
69. See Mastanduno, supra note 57, at 524-29; D. BALDWIN, supra note 66, at 23550.
70. Although it may have retarded Soviet military capacity less than a well-designed
economic warfare strategy-focusing on bottleneck items in the Soviet economy rather
than on items with direct military applications-the selective embargo technique has
been the basis on which the United States-which prefers broader controls-and Europe-which prefers less extensive controls-have been able to cooperate in strategic
trade controls. See D. BALDWIN, supra note 66, at 245-46.
71. See U.S. Export Control Policy and Extension of the Export Administration Act:
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vehicles and machinery for producing military equipment to nations en73
gaged in regional conflicts.
Symbolic communication is a much misunderstood function of economic sanctions. Commentators often suggest that symbolic controls have
no instrumental function, that they are simply a way of letting off steam
or playing to a domestic political audience.7 In fact, however, sanctions
can perform important functions even when they cannot reduce the target state's capabilities or force it to change its policies.7 5
Sanctions can communicate, more credibly than mere words, the sanctioning state's commitment to a particular position, the seriousness with
which it views foreign conduct, its intention to act and its willingness to
bear costs. Sanctions can also communicate the threat of harsher action
to follow in the future. Messages like these can be important instruments
of deterrence."6 Sanctions can also communicate moderation and restraint, perhaps avoiding unnecessary conflict. 7 They can create a psychological sense of isolation or shame or spur reconsideration of target
state policies even if they impose no substantial costs on the target."
Sanctions can communicate diverse messages like these to states, groups
and individuals other than the immediate target state.79
Of the four rationales discussed here, then, two-the first and
third-are concerned with affecting capabilities, and two-the second
and fourth-with affecting intentions and will. Any given sanction, however, may reflect two or more rationales at the same time. Indeed, almost
all sanctions communicate some message regardless of their other effects.

Hearings on S. 737 and S. 999 Before the Subcomm. on InternationalFinance of the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs - PartII, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
145, 157-58 (1979) (statement of Jerry Goodman) (crime control equipment can be used
to monitor and repress dissidents and minorities).
72. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 24050); 15 C.F.R. § 376.14, 385.4(d)(1)(a). For a discussion of the origin of these controls, see Abbott, supra note 2, at 787-90.
73. See 15 C.F.R. § 376.16, 385.4(d)(1). For a discussion of the regional stability
policy, see Abbott, supra note 2, at 761-62.
74. See D.

BALDWIN,

supra note 66, at 96-97; Abbott, supra note 2, at 822-24.

75. See D.

BALDWIN,

supra note 66, at 97-101.

76. See id. at 102-14.
77. See id. at 104, 185 (United States embargo of Cuba demonstrated restraint when
compared with the history of military intervention in Latin America).
78. See id. at 61-65.
79. See id. at 17-18.
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THE RATIONALES FOR SANCTIONS APPLIED

We are now ready to consider how the major rationales for economic
sanctions apply-in principle and in the practice of the United
States-to the different levels of state involvement in terrorism, by examining the matrix in Figure 3.
On most rows of the matrix, the same entries apply to both state supported and state sponsored terrorism, the last two columns. Once the
international community has decided on secondary liability for the support of terrorism, in other words,"0 most sanctions strategies are both
appropriate and used in practice, subject to considerations of cost and
effectiveness, for dealing with both forms of state involvement. The distinctions between sponsorship and support and among degrees of support
are reflected primarily in the strength of the sanctions applied."1 Economic warfare is an exception, however. This rationale seems appropriate, if at all, only for dealing with states that sponsor terrorism or that
willfully provide extensive support as a substitute for sponsorship, as a
form of hostilities.8 2
Only the denial of means and symbolic communication rationales are
relevant to all three columns of the matrix, including the first column,
which represents the absence of state involvement. Restrictions on munitions exports, for example, can limit the ability of terrorist groups to
obtain sophisticated arms; many kinds of sanctions can convey messages
of commitment directly to such groups, although this is rarely their primary purpose. The economic warfare and imposing costs rationales, in
contrast, focus exclusively on supporting or sponsoring states.
The remainder of this section will consider individually the four rows
of the matrix, each corresponding to one of the rationales for economic
sanctions.
A.

Economic Warfare

Many commentators and policy makers have come to see state sponsorship of terrorism as a form of low intensity warfare against the
West."' President Reagan has extended this perspective to repeated state
80. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
81. See infra notes 110-115 and accompanying text.
82. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
83. See Jenkins, New Modes of Conflict, 28 ORBIs 5, 12 (1976) (some governments
see terrorism as a "weapons system," an inexpensive way of waging war); Pierre, supra
note 45, at 1268-69 (states may see terrorism as "continuation of warfare by other
means," inexpensive, covert, and efficient); Kupperman, supra note 26, at 25, 32 (support of terrorism is low-cost, low-risk strategy for states); Wilkinson, Terrorism: The
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support of terrorism. In ordering the embargo of Libya in January 1986,
the President said, "By providing material support to terrorist groups
which attack U.S. citizens, Libya has engaged'8in armed aggression . . .
just as if [it] had used its own armed forces." '
Against this background the economic warfare rationale might appear
to support sanctions against states that sponsor or provide extensive support for terrorism. The theory would be that sanctions could reduce the
capacity of such states to engage in this form of combat by denying them
economic gains from trade that they could use to support terrorism. One
could view the United States embargo of Libya8 5 as a current application
of this rationale.
One must question, however, whether the rationale is appropriate,
even for terrorist-sponsoring states. Economic warfare assumes that the
enemy needs extensive economic resources for its military sector; its
model is a full-scale conventional war.88 Terrorism, however, requires a
much smaller commitment of resources than even a limited war; this is a
large part of its appeal.8 While the authoritarian states that sponsor
terrorism could probably divert all the gains from trade realized by their
civilian economies to the support of terrorism, they will rarely need to do
SO.
In terms of the economic warfare rationale alone, then, embargoes of
terrorist-supporting states, and even extensive bottleneck controls on
transactions of strategic importance to their civilian economies, are probably ill-advised. Such sanctions are unlikely to reduce the economic capacity of the target states sufficiently to limit their sponsorship of terrorism, and the costs incurred by the sanctioning states88 are accordingly
likely to be out of proportion to the benefits.8"

InternationalResponse, 34 WORLD TODAY 5, 6 (1978) (states developing "proxy" terrorists as weapon of coercive diplomacy); Shultz, supra note 43, at 205; Tokyo Economic
Summit Statement on Terrorism, supra note 30 (summit states abhor use of terrorism as

blatant instrument of government policy).
84.

Economic Sanctions Against Libya, Statement by President Reagan, President's

News Conference of Jan. 7, 1986, reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 175 (1986).
85.

See supra notes 14-15, 84 and accompanying text.

86. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
87.

Most commentators observe that certain states have turned to the support of ter-

rorism precisely because it is a low-cost strategy, especially when one compares it with
more conventional military action. See supra note 83.
88. For a discussion of these costs, in the context of the imposing costs rationale, see
infra notes 138-48 and accompanying text.
89. David Baldwin stresses the need to compare the use of economic sanctions with
other courses of action available to governments, including doing nothing, when evaluating the effectiveness of sanctions; he properly points out that most analyses of sanctions
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Judging from the statements of American officials, at least, the United
States did not intend its embargo of Libya to be an exercise in economic
warfare. It based the embargo primarily on two other sanctions rationales: imposing costs9" and symbolic communication, 91 both of which I
will discuss below. In practice, of course, sanctions implementing these
two rationales can be all but indistinguishable from economic warfare.
B. Imposing Costs
Sanctions designed to impose economic costs are largely irrelevant to
terrorism carried on without state support; they are too blunt an instrument to be used in pressuring small groups of terrorists. Sanctions based
on this rationale have become one of the major enforcement strategies for
dealing with terrorist-supporting and sponsoring states, however, and as
such one must consider them at some length.
The United States has expressly based many of its antiterrorism sanctions, at least in part, on the rationale of imposing costs. A 1986 State
Department report entitled Economic Sanctions to Combat International Terrorism states that "economic sanctions are an integral part of
[the] peaceful measures that we can take to deter states from supporting
terrorism," and that sanctions "may be used to pressure targeted states to
change their policies." 2 Numerous statements by the President and the
Depaitment of State demonstrate that imposing costs on Libya in order
to deter future support for terrorists or simply to exact a price for nonproceed in a vacuum. See D. BALDWIN, supra note 66, at 15, 123-28. In the present
context, the point is that sanctions based on the economic warfare rationale, are unlikely
to reduce significantly the economic capacity of the target state to sponsor terrorism, but
will require the sanctioning state to incur economic and other costs. Thus, while some
alternatives may be more effective, net of costs, and others less effective, economic warfare will typically be less effective than doing nothing. If one also considers other rationales for economic sanctions, however, the calculus may well change.
90. See infra notes 91-148 and accompanying text.
91. A principal goal of the embargo appears to have been to help isolate the government of Colonel Qadhafi from the "civilized world." See National Emergency with Respect to Libya, President Reagan's Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President
of the Senate, Jan. 7, 1986, reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 174, 175 (1986) ("We must demonstrate by firm political and economic sanctions that . . . states that engage in [the support of terrorism] cannot expect to be accepted members of the international community."); Economic Sanctions Against Libya, President Reagan's Statement at News
Conference of Jan. 7, 1986, reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 175, 176 (1986) ("Qadhafi deserves
to be treated as a pariah in the world community. We call on our friends . . . to join
with us in isolating him."). For a discussion of a similar rationale in the case of the Syria
sanctions, see infra note 193 and accompanying text.
92. See State Department Report, supra note 1, at 1.
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compliance with international norms and American demands was a major motivation for the 1986 embargo. 3 Secretary of State Shultz applied
the same rationale to the subsequent bombing of Libya: "If you raise the
cost, you do something that should eventually act as a deterrent. That is
the primary objective. ...

The leverage rationale is also apparent in the coverage of more modest
antiterrorism sanctions. United States export controls, for example, have
focused on commercial aircraft,9 5 high technology products,96 sophisticated oil field equipment, 97 and other items that play important roles in
the economies of the target states, but which those states cannot easily
produce themselves or obtain from other sources. In 1982 the United
States prohibited oil imports from Libya, restricting an important source
of foreign exchange.9 8 The Bonn Declaration 9 9-one of the few multilateral steps toward sanctioning supporters of terrorism, under which the
Summit Seven states agreed to halt bilateral air traffic service to countries that refuse to extradite or prosecute airplane hijackers 1°-similarly
reflects the imposing costs rationale.10 1
93. See National Emergency with Respect to Libya, supra note 91, at 174 (prior
sanctions have not deterred Libya from use of terrorism); Economic Sanctions Against
Libay, supra note 91, at 175 (sanctions necessary to exact a "high price" from Qadhafi
for support of terrorism); Sanctions Against Libya, Statement by Principal Deputy Press
Secretary to the President, Jan. 8, 1986, reprintedin 25 I.L.M. at 179 (1986) (sanctions
necessary to exact "high cost" and "premium," to convince Qadhafi that "terrorism will
not be cost-free").
94. See Statement of Secretary of State Shultz, DEP'T ST. BULL., June 1986, at 3, 4.
95. For years those concerned with the design of economic sanctions have seen commercial aircraft, which have until recently been produced primarily in the United States,
as one of the greatest potential sources of leverage over terrorist-supporting states. See
Abbott, supra note 2, at 769-70.
96. The United States has for several years restricted exports to terrorist-supporting
states of all high-technology products and technical data controlled for national security
purposes. See id. at 770-71; 15 C.F.R. § 385.4(d) (1987).
97. In restricting exports to Libya in 1982, the Department of Commerce announced
that it would deny export licenses for oil and gas equipment and related technical data.
Expansion of Foreign Policy Export Controls Affecting Libya, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,247
(1982); 15 C.F.R. § 385.7(a) (1987).
98. Proclamation No. 4907, 47 Fed. Reg. 10,507 (1982), continued by Proclamation
No. 5141, 48 Fed. Reg. 56,929 (1983).
99. Reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1285 (1978).
100. In a statement on terrorism at the 1987 Venice Economic Summit, the Summit
Seven states agreed on measures to extend and strengthen the sanctions they would impose under the Declaration. See Venice Statement on Terrorism and Annex thereto, reprinted in N.Y. Times, June 10, 1987, at 10, col. 3.
101. See Bienen & Gilpin, Economic Sanctions as a Response to Terrorism, 3 J.
STRATEGIC STUDIES 89, 95 (1980).
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In the decentralized international system, economic sanctions like these
have a special place, for they are one of the few ways in which states can
implement the theory of rational deterrence in support of international
norms.10 2 Under international law, a state injured by another state's violation of a legal obligation is entitled to respond with countermeasures,
or measures of self-help, even if those measures might otherwise be unlawful."' International law theory often justifies such countermeasures
as restoring symmetry or equality between the states involved. 104 According to the Revised Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, international
law permits countermeasures only to induce the violating state to terminate or remedy its violation or to prevent further violation." 5 Because
countermeasures impose costs on a violating state, however, the threat of
their use clearly functions as a deterrent."0 e Since states supporting or
sponsoring terrorism violate a legal obligation,107 antiterrorism sanctions
imposed by injured states l1 would normally constitute valid countermea-

102. See supra notes 56-67 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the problems
of decentralized retaliation in maintaining international cooperation, see Axelrod & Keohane, Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy, supra note 27, at 232-47.
103. See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
(REVISED) § 905 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1987); Case Concerning Air Services Agreement
Between France and the United States, Arbitral Award of Dec. 9, 1978, 18
U.N.R.I.A.A. 417 V 81. The injured state is also entitled to take measures of "retorsion,"
traditionally those countermeasures a state is legally free to take whether or not another
state has breached an international legal obligation. "Reprisal," in contrast, is the usual
term for counter-measures that would be unlawful were it not for a prior violation of
international law. See L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 541-42 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter L. HENKIN]. Traditionally reprisals
were punitive measures, often involving the use of force. See RESTATEMENT, supra, at §
905, comment f.
104. See Case Concerning Air Services Agreement, supra note 103, at T 90.
105. RESTATEMENT, supra note 103, at § 905(1)(a), comment f.
106. An official comment to the Revised Restatement states that the principle of "necessity" would ordinarily preclude countermeasures designed only as retribution for a
violation, not as an incentive to terminate the violation or remedy it. Id. Section 905
itself, however, provides that a state may use countermeasures to prevent further violation, that is, to deter. Id. at § 905(1)(a), and another comment states that the principle of
necessity would be satisfied if the violating state refused to negotiate, pay compensation
or submit to third-party dispute resolution. See id. at § 905(1)(a), comment e.
107. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
108. States not directly injured by a violation of a legal obligation-including obligations relating to the support of terrorism-have sometimes joined in economic sanctions
on the theory that the violation affected a community interest. See L. HENKIN, supra
note 103, at 550-51. Action under the Bonn Declaration, see supra text accompanying
note 99, would appear to fall within this category.

1987]

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND TERRORISM

sures under international law.10 9

The principal restriction on the use of countermeasures is that the
measures taken must be proportionate or equivalent to the original offense." This principle is in all circumstances difficult to apply,""' but
most of the antiterrorism sanctions the United States has imposed appear
to have been roughly proportional.
The United States has generally imposed and strengthened sanctions
in response to such factors as the duration and extent of the target state's
support for terrorist groups, the target state's sponsorship of or direct
participation in terrorist acts, as opposed to more passive support, and
the heinousness of the terrorist acts to which the target state's involvement contributed. In imposing the Libya embargo, for example, President Reagan stressed Libya's longstanding "pattern of aggression,' ' 1
Colonel Qadhafi's use of terrorism as "one of the primary instruments of
his foreign policy" ' and Libya's role in the Rome and Vienna airport
killings carried out by the Abu Nidal terrorist group. 4 Similarly, in
strengthening sanctions against Syria in 1986, the United States stressed
Syria's long pattern of support for terrorism, both as sponsor and supporter, and the evidence of its direct participation, through military and
diplomatic personnel, in the attempted bombing of an El Al passenger
plane by a terrorist recruited for the purpose.1 1

109. In the absence of relevant treaty commitments, in fact, the international community would consider most economic sanctions to be retorsions, which states may validly
take to respond to violations of international law or unfriendly acts. See L. HENKIN,
supra note 103, at 548-49.
110. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 103, at § 905(1)(b); Case Concerning Air Services Agreement, supra note 103, at 83. The requirement may also apply to acts of
retorsion. See L. HENKIN, supra note 103, at 550; RESTATEMENT, supra note 103, at §
905, comment a (diplomatic relations, communication, and trade are "fundamentals of
interstate intercourse and in practice are governed by the conditions of necessity and
proportionally and are not seriously disrupted for any but the grossest violation.") It
would be difficult to apply the test of "equivalence," see Case Concerning Air Services
Agreement, supra note 103, at 1 83, in the case of countermeasures to the support or
sponsorship of international terrorism, because "equivalent" measures might be unlawful, and would, in any case, be repugnant to most nations. L. HENKIN, supra note 103,
at 547.
111. See Case Concerning Air Services Agreement, supra note 103, at 83.
112. See U.S. Department of State, Libya Under Qadhafi: Pattern of Aggression,
reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 182 (1986).
113. See id.
114. See Economic Sanctions Against Libya, supra note 84, at 175 ("the latest in a
series of atrocities which have shocked the conscience of the world.")
115. See White House Statement, supra note 16; Syrian Support for International
Terrorism: 1983-86, DEP'T ST. BULL., Feb. 1987, at 73.
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In spite of their seeming appropriateness, however, one must consider
whether sanctions designed to impose costs on target states are likely to
be effective in reducing undesirable conduct.11 Unfortunately, most commentators, whether analyzing sanctions in the abstract or looking at past
experience, have concluded that sanctions are unlikely to succeed except
in unusual circumstances. 117 Well-respected analysts have reached this
conclusion explicitly with regard to sanctions aimed at the support of
terrorism. 1 Without reviewing the large literature on this point, consider some of the basic problems.
First, successful deterrence may require better knowledge of target
state activities than is often available.1 9 Failing to respond to state involvement in terrorism because of a lack of information will obviously do
nothing to deter such involvement. Responding with economic sanctions
when states have not been involved in terrorism, or have been involved at
a lower level than is believed, will not only entail unnecessary costs for
the sanctioning state, 120 but may "spread and [deepen] the conflict without punishing the terrorist groups themselves. 1 21
Second, it will often be difficult to implement economic sanctions that
impose significant costs on the target states. Most basically, a state can
only utilize negative economic sanctions if there are economic links to
sever.1 22 The United States has few economic links with most of the

116. See Kraakman, supra note 38, at 61; supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
117. For a number of years, a "striking consensus" on the inefficiency of economic
sanctions viewed as instruments of leverage has prevailed among commentators. Abbott,
supra note 2, at 821. Daoudi and Dajani have compiled pages of quotations demonstrating the overwhelming consensus. M. DAOUDI & M. DAJANI, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS:
IDEALS AND EXPERIENCE 43-48, 178-88 (1983). For a recent example, in 1984, the
political scientist Klaus Knorr opined that one could best explain most recent uses of
economic sanctions, at least those arising during "crises of high diplomacy," as "inept
statecraft," or as "degradations of rationality." Knorr, supra note 66, at 203. Even Hufbauer and Schott, whose work in some ways rehabilitates the use of economic leverage,
see G. HUFBAUER & J. SCHOTT, supra note 60, at 42 (in "modest policy change cases,"
states using economic sanctions have often "made some progress in achieving [their]
goals"), find success to have been limited and to have come primarily in special circumstances. See id. at 42-47, 79-81.
118. See Bienen & Gilpin, supra note 101, at 89.
119. See supra note 27.
120. See infra note 138.
121. Axelrod & Keohane, supra note 27, at 235.
122. See G. HUFBAUER & J. SCHOTT,supra note 60, at 84-85. The authors observe
that economic sanctions have typically been more effective when directed against friends
and trading partners than when aimed at adversaries and states with few economic links.
The conclusion to which this observation leads them-"attack your allies, not your adversaries"-is unfortunate, however. See Abbott, supra note 19.
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states involved in terrorism: 123 for example, for some time it has had
minimal trade and air traffic with Syria and has given it no foreign aid.
In addition, economic sanctions will have little bite if alternate suppliers
and markets are readily available. 24 In the modern economy this is usually the case. 125 The fact that other Western states, including many
whose economic links to the terrorist-supporting states are more significant than those of the United States, are unwilling to impose strong antiterrorism sanctions, exacerbates the problem 12 and leads to a charge of
free-riding on American measures. 27 In terms of rational deterrence theory, a single state will often find it difficult to set a penalty high enough
2
to deter terrorism effectively.' 1
Third, even if a state can impose significant economic sanctions, its
actions will only serve to reduce terrorism if the target states respond to
the use or threat of sanctions by reducing their support or sponsorship.
Some terrorist-supporting states-a radical Islamic state like Iran immediately comes to mind-may weigh the incentives presented by sanctions
very differently from the rational state that the theory of deterrence assumes.' 2 9 Against such a state, sanctions may be ineffective or even
counterproductive. A similar problem with the deterrence of individual
fanatic terrorists, one should note, was one of the principal reasons for
considering secondary enforcement against supporting states in the first
30
place.'
Finally, secondary liability will only be effective if the gatekeepers can
actually prevent the undesirable activities of the primary wrongdoers. 31'
Here the distinction between sponsorship and support becomes important. A state that sponsors terrorism and is the primary wrongdoer will
presumably be able to call off the terrorists under its command, cease its
own participation in terrorist acts and terminate recruitment, incitement

123. See Bialos & Juster, supra note 15, at 842-43, n.141.
124. See State Department Report, supra note 1, at 1; Abbott, supra note 2, at 80010; Knorr, supra note 66, at 191-93.
125. See State Department Report, supra note 1, at 1; G. HUFBAUER & J. SCHOTT,
supra note 2, at 80-81.
126. See supra note 50.

127. See Abbott, Collective Goods, Mobile Resources, and ExtraterritorialTrade
Controls, LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. (forthcoming).
128. See R. POSNER, supra note 44, at 170-71. It is probably true, however, that
economic sanctions often work slowly and cumulatively, so that their effects are difficult
to discern. See D. BALDWIN, supra note 66, at 133-34.
129. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
131. See Kraakman, supra note 38, at 61, 63, 66-74.
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and similar activities. A terrorist-supporting state, however, may be unable to control the independent terrorist groups it has been assisting even
if it withdraws its support."3 2
Once a state terminates its support of terrorism, terrorists can follow
several strategies available to any primary wrongdoer. First, they can
shop for other states that are still willing to support them, or that are at
least unable to evict them.1"3 Members of the Abu Nidal group, for example, have moved their operations from Iraq to Syrian-controlled areas
of Lebanon, have begun to take sanctuary in Eastern Europe and have
134
begun to receive support from Libya as well as from earlier patrons.
Terrorists can turn to illicit markets-operated clandestinely by states or
private interests-for arms, passports and other supplies.13 " They can
disguise their activities so as to continue using the target state's territory
as a base of operations and sanctuary. They can operate with reduced
levels of assistance. Terrorist groups can also, of course, attempt to corrupt the original supporting state into continuing some facets of its support surreptitiously, 38 a strategy that exploits the difficulty of obtaining
137
reliable information about state activities.
Along with these weaknesses in the effectiveness of economic sanctions
as instruments of influence, one must also consider the costs of employing them. 8 Kraakman suggests three categories of costs associated with
secondary enforcement.1 3 The first, and most familiar, is administrative
cost, the cost of monitoring and penalizing gatekeepers who violate established norms. Domestically, these costs are likely to be relatively minor,
although highly visible, because they are marginal costs to a functioning
enforcement system that will already be dealing with the primary
wrongdoers. 4 ° Private costs are the costs of compliance that secondary
enforcement imposes on gatekeepers, including the costs of the routines
132. See Terrorism: Oversight Hearings, supra note 27, at 45 (testimony of Prof.
Martha Crenshaw).
133. See Kraakman, supra note 38, at 63, 66-67, 72-74.
134. See Syrian Support for InternationalTerrorism, supra note 115, at 73.
135. See infra note 81 and accompanying text. Cf Kraakman, supra note 38, at 6669.
136. See Kraakman, supra note 38, at 63, 69-72.
137. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
138. Effectiveness and cost are the two principal criteria for evaluating the performance of any strategy of enforcement. See Kraakman, supra note 44, at 61, 74-75. Together, effectiveness and cost determine the utility of a strategy, see D. BALDWIN, supra
note 66, at 119, which one must then compare with the utility of other possible approaches. See id. at 120-28.
139. See Kraakman, supra note 38, at 75.
140. See id. at 75 n.61.
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necessary to avoid liability and any residual risk of liability. Tertiary
costs are those that fall on other parties, such as the innocent customers
of gatekeepers who may be caught in the gatekeepers' enforcement routines. Although less visible than administrative costs, these two categories
are also important social costs.
In sanctioning states involved in terrorism, the administrative costs
will almost certainly be more significant than in domestic law enforcement, for they will not be marginal costs added to an ongoing enforcement system but an entirely different and additional set of costs.14 1 Administrative costs in this context will include, among others, the costs of
monitoring targets and potential target states14 2 and of negotiating with
those states 14 and with allies.
The greatest administrative costs, however, will be those resulting
from the economic sanctions themselves. These costs include lost gains
from trade, indirect economic costs arising out of a reputation for interrupting commercial transactions, additional indirect costs resulting from
efforts to minimize the potential impact of extraterritorial application,
political costs resulting from friction with targets, potential targets and
their allies as well as with the sanctioning state's own allies, and disruption of the open trading system. Although these costs are very difficult to
measure14 4 or even to estimate,145 their general nature is fairly well understood, 1 6 and I will not discuss them in greater detail here.
The private costs incurred by target or potential target states seeking

141. Under some circumstances, the costs incurred in imposing sanctions will constitute an advantage. See infra text accompanying note 187.
142. This will involve primarily the gathering of intelligence.
143. Section 3(8) of the Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(8)
(1982), requires the President to make reasonable efforts to secure the termination of
state assistance to terrorists through "international cooperation and agreement" before
using export controls for that purpose.
144. See D. BALDWIN, supra note 66, at 128-30; G. HUFBAUER & J. SCHOTT,
supra note 60, at 65.
145. See, e.g., G. HUFBAUER & J. SCHOTT, supra note 60, at 64-65. The authors
note, for example, that cutting foreign assistance as a sanction may actually help the
sanctioning state financially, but that the lost contacts may translate into offsetting export
losses. One might add to this observation that, if the sanctioning state used the money
saved to increase aid to other countries, exports to and investment in those countries
might correspondingly increase, although the same firms or industries would probably
not be affected.
146. See, e.g., Abbott, supra note 2, at 826-57; State Department Report, supra note

1, at 2; Moyer & Mabry, Export Controls as Instruments of Foreign Policy: The History, Legal Issues and Policy Lessons of Three Recent Cases, 15 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 1, 149-56 (1983); G.

HUFBAUER

& J. SCHOTT, supra note 60, at 64-66.
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to avoid sanctions would not seem severe, at least as compared with the
problems arising in domestic economic settings.,4 7 It should not be difficult for such states to terminate activities directly supportive of terrorism,
and doing so might actually bring economic benefits. Exercising due diligence to ensure that terrorist groups are not using state territory might
be costly, though, and there might be some risk of residual liability.
Tertiary costs also seem likely to be less troublesome than in domestic
law enforcement because there are relatively few transactions between
potential target states and innocent persons that the threat of economic
sanctions might distort. It is possible, however, that the members of a
high-risk group-Palestinians, for example-could become victims of
discrimination by a potential target state seeking to avoid all possible risk
48

of sanctions.1

Neither private nor tertiary costs, one should note, will be social costs
of the sanctioning state, as they are in domestic contexts. In practical
terms, then, these costs will not weigh heavily in decisions on the use of
economic sanctions.
C. Denial of Means
The denial of means strategy calls for restricting sales of selected items
that would contribute to a target state's capability to support or engage
in a particular form of wrongdoing. 4 9 In the present context, for example, one might attempt to limit a target state's access to items needed to
train, supply, equip and otherwise assist terrorist groups. If effective,
this strategy would be a valuable complement to the strategy of leverage
since it could help limit the capabilities of terrorist sponsoring and supporting states even when they ignored efforts to deter them. Because of
the selective nature of the controls required, moreover, it would be less
costly to the sanctioning state than the strategies previously considered.
Restrictions on the sale of arms to states involved in terrorism exemplify the denial of means rationale.1 5 0 In the United States, under the
Arms Export Control Act,1 5' the President may refuse to make military
sales to foreign countries' 52 and may prohibit private arms sales' 5 3 for

147. See Kraakman, supra note 38, at 75-77.
148. A domestic analogy is employer discrimination against Hispanics in order to
avoid gatekeeper liability under a legal regime aimed at illegal aliens. See id. at 77.
149. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
150. These restrictions presumably implement the imposing costs and symbolic communications rationales as well.
151. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751-2796c (1982 & Supp. 1 1983).

152. Id. at § 2752(b).
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foreign policy reasons. Under this authority, the government prohibits
exports of items on the Munitions List to states that the Secretary of
State has determined to be supporters of terrorism.'" In addition, the
Act requires the President to terminate arms sales to any country that
grants sanctuary to an individual or group that has committed a terrorist
act.1 55 The Western allies have generally cooperated in the restriction of
arms sales, 156 presumably reflecting the widespread concern about the
consequences that might ensue if terrorists gained access to sophisticated
weapons. 51 These restrictions, by reducing to some extent the availability of weapons on international markets, especially in volatile regions,
may have served to hamper even independent terrorist groups.
Under the Export Administration Act (EAA), the United States has
explicitly adopted the denial of means rationale for its antiterrorism export controls on goods other than munitions. First, according to the State
Department, the licensing requirements in force under the EAA for antiterrorism purposes are "aimed at restricting the export of goods or
technology that would contribute significantly to the military potential or
enhance the terrorist-support capabilities of [target] countries."' 5 In addition, the EAA requires the executive branch to determine whether any
proposed export valued at more than $1 million and destined for a terrorist-supporting state would make a significant contribution to the military potential of that state or would "enhance the ability of [that] country to support acts of international terrorism.' 59 If so, the Executive
153. Id. at § 2778.
154. See State Department Report, supra note 1, at 4.
155. 22 U.S.C. § 2753(0 (1982). An exception exists, however, for situations where
the President finds that the national security requires a continuation of sales.
156. See State Department Report, supra note 1, at 3; Tokyo Economic Summit
Statement on Terrorism, supra note 30 (Summit Seven countries agree, "within the
framework of international law and in our own jurisdictions," to deny arms exports to
states clearly involved in the support of terrorism, in order to "deny to international
terrorists the ... means to carry out their aims."); Robert B. Oakley, Acting Ambassador at Large for Counter-Terrorism, statement before Subcomm. on Security and Terrorism of Sen. Judiciary Comm., reprinted in DEP'T OF STATE BULL., Aug. 1986, at 5,
7 (describing decision of European Community foreign ministers not to export arms to
terrorist-supporting states).
157. See, e.g., Kupperman, supra note 38, at 28-29; Jenkins, supra note 83, at 11;
Pierre, supra note 45, at 1256.
158. See State Department Report, supra note 1, at 4. See also White House Statement, supra note 16.
159. See Export Administration Act, § 6(j), 50 U.S.C. app. § 24050) (1982). The
threshold value was $7 million for several years; Congress reduced it to $1 million in
1986. Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-399
(amending Export Administration Act, § 60)(1)).
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branch must notify the designated Congressioial committees before licensing the export, 60° a provision clearly designed to discourage the approval of such exports."' 1
The implementation of this policy, however, has been quite unsatisfying. Consider the products that were restricted for export to Syria under
the antiterrorism policy of the EAA as of the end of 1986.
First, aircraft and helicopters valued at $3 million or more. 162 These
could, however, be sold to scheduled Syrian airlines if assurances against
1 3
military use were received. 1
Second, goods and technology subject to national security controls-high technology items with military applications-but only if sold
to Syrian military organizations or for Syrian military uses, and only if
valued at $7 million or more."" Most of these items required a license
for export to Syria under the EAA's national security provisions 165-because
of the possibility of diversion to the Soviet
Union-long before the United States imposed antiterrorism
sanctions.16 6
Third, certain military vehicles and machinery designed to produce
military equipment.16 7 These items were already controlled for export to
many destinations, including Syria, under the "regional stability" policy, 168 a denial of means strategy aimed at limiting military conflicts in

The Act also states that it is the policy of the United States to use export controls to
"encourage other countries" to cease rendering assistance to terrorists, id. § 2402(8), and
authorizes the President to restrict exports of goods and technology in order to carry out
that policy, id. § 2405(a)(1). These provisions appear to be motivated by the leverage
and symbolic communication rationales.
160. Id. at § 60), 50 U.S.C. § 2405(i).
161. See Note, Export Controls and the U.S. Effort to Combat International Terrorism, 13 LAW & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 521 (1981).
162. 15 C.F.R. § 385.4(d)(2) (1987).
163. Id.
164. Id. The $7 million floor was consistent with the Congressional notice requirement in effect at the time. See supra note 159. As of the end of 1986, the United States
considered license applications for the export of such items on a case-by-case basis with
reference to both the antiterrorism policy and basic national security considerations. 15
C.F.R. § 385.4(d)(2) (1987).
165. Export Administration Act, § 5, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404 (1982).
166. Most national security controls cover exports to virtually all destinations, and
the government makes decisions on the issuance of licenses in large part with reference to
the danger of diversion. See Abbott, supra note 2, at 752-54; 15 C.F.R. § 385.4(g)(1)
(1987).
167. 15 C.F.R. § 385.4(d)(1)(b), 376.16 (1987).
168. See supra text accompanying note 4. In addition to special licensing requirements, the regional stability policy has led to the denial of licenses for the export of goods
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the Middle East and elsewhere,'
70

69

-limiting Libya's ability to operate in

Chad, for example.1

Fourth, certain crime control and detection equipment. 17 1 These items,

too, were already controlled for export to many destinations, including
Syria, as a denial of means and symbolic communication strategy
1 72
designed to promote observance of human rights.
And that was all. In June 1987173 the United States extended controls
to all aircraft and removed the exception for sales to scheduled airlines.
It extended antiterrorism controls on goods already controlled for national security purposes to transactions under $7 million and to those not
involving a military purchase or end use and tightened the policy on
licensing such exports. It, however, did not expand any other controls on
17 4

exports to Syria.
Even as expanded, it appears that most of these controls-especially
those based on the national security and regional stability policies, including the controls on aircraft-were designed primarily to limit conventional military capabilities, not the ability to support terrorism.

7 5

controlled for national security reasons to countries engaged in regional hostilities. See
Abbott, supra note 2, at 761-62.
169. See 15 C.F.R. §§ 376.16, 385.4(g)(3) (1987). See also id. at § 385.4(e) (controls
on export of certain chemicals used in chemical warfare).
170. Libya is subject to separate regional stability controls. See 15 C.F.R. §§
385.4(g)(3), 385.7 (1987).
171. 15 C.F.R. § 385.4(d)(1)(a), 376.14 (1987). See supra text accompanying notes
71-72.
172. See 15 C.F.R. §§ 376.14; 385.4(g)(2) (1987).
173. See supra note 16.
174. See 52 Fed. Reg. 23,167 (June 18, 1987). The criteria for favorable consideration of license applications announced as part of the 1987 regulations, see supra note 16,
only apply to transactions newly controlled by those regulations. See id., adding 15
C.F.R. § 385.4(d)(4)(iii). The extension of controls on national security-controlled items
to sales below $7 million parallels a reduction from $7 million to $1 million in the
threshold above which exporters must notify Congress of applications to export goods
subject to antiterrorism controls. See supra note 159. Prior to the announcement of new
sanctions against Syria, the government also extended to Syria existing controls on the
export of certain chemicals to Iran and Iraq-based on United States opposition to prohibited use of chemical weapons-with an exception for existing contracts. 51 Fed. Reg.
20,467 (une 5, 1986) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 385.4(e)). The government has
since subjected additional chemicals to these controls. 52 Fed. Reg. 28,550 (July 31,
1987).
175. Terrorists would find some restricted crime control and detection equipment
useful. Examples include certain weapons and protective clothing that the police customarily use and items like leg irons, handcuffs and thumbscrews-controlled as instruments
of torture-that terrorists could use in the mistreatment of hostages.
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That may be a very desirable goal, but for the most part it is a different
goal.17 6 The government has largely limited its national security controls,
moreover, to high technology products-selected with the strategic forces
of the Soviet Union in mind-that are irrelevant to most forms of terrorism whether purchased by civilian or military organizations. 17 7 In any
case, as already noted, most of the antiterrorism controls-sometimes imposed with considerable fanfare-were not actually new controls; the
same items were already restricted under another policy.' 7 8 It is hard to
avoid the conclusion that the antiterrorism export controls based on the
denial of means rationale amount to far less than meets the eye.
It is probably true, however, that it would be fruitless to implement
this sanctions strategy much more broadly. Even extensive product controls would have virtually no effect on many forms of support for terrorism such as moral support, financial support,' 79 passports, and sanctuary. Even the present controls on arms exports, though they may help
restrict the availability of advanced weapons, are likely to have little effect on the volume of ordinary terrorism. Terrorists can, and do, carry
out most of their acts using only small arms, ordinary explosives, and
similar weapons.' 80 These items will continue to be available in licit and

176. To the extent such controls denied access to arms that terrorists might use effectively, however, the goal would be the same.
177. See Export Administration Act, § 5(d), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(d) (1982) (limits
controls to the extent possible and consistent with national security purpose, to militarily
critical technologies which, if exported, would permit a significant advance in the military system of a controlled country).
178. The Export Administration Regulations provide that the government will administer licensing requirements imposed under multiple policies in accordance with the
most restrictive policy. 15 C.F.R. § 388.1.
179. Some economic sanctions do not limit access to specific products, but restrict
access to foreign exchange. Examples from United States practice include § 505 of the
International Security and Development Corporation Act of 1985, 22 U.S.C. § 2349aa-9
(authorizing the President to ban imports from any country that harbors or otherwise
supports terrorists); id. at § 504, 22 U.S.C. § 2349aa-8 (authorizing a ban on imports
from Libya); Export-Import Bank of Washington Act, § 2(b)(1)(B), 12 U.S.C. §
635(b)(1)(B) (authorizing denial of applications for Eximbank credits if the President
determines this would be in the national interest and would clearly and importantly
advance American antiterrorism policy); Trade Act of 1974, § 502(b)(7), 19 U.S.C. §
2462(b)(6) (requiring the President not to designate states supporting terrorism as beneficiary developing countries under Generalized System of Preferences). Such sanctions
could affect a target country's ability to provide financial support. As with the economic
warfare rationale, however, see supra note 122 and accompanying text, it is unlikely that
this strategy can reduce the economic resources of a target state sufficiently to seriously
limit its ability to finance terrorist acts.
v
180. See Jenkins, Statements About Terrorism, 463 ANNALS 11, 12-14 (1982); Wil-
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illicit private markets and from alternate suppliers, including the Soviet
Union."'
D. Symbolic Communication
Commentators often ignore or denigrate the symbolic uses of economic
83
sanctions, 8 2 but recent scholarship has emphasized their importance.1
As noted on the bottom row of the matrix in Figure 3, sanctions can
communicate a variety of messages to multiple audiences, including terrorist groups themselves, and can thereby serve important instrumental
functions. 8 Examining these symbolic messages may help us understand some antiterrorism measures that other sanctions rationales do not
fully explain. To illustrate, the remainder of this section will spell out
some of the messages that the United States appears to have communicated by strengthening economic sanctions against Syria in November
1986.
First, the expansion of sanctions against Syria demonstrated to terrorist groups, including those not supported by Syria, that the United States
continued to view terrorism as a serious problem. The sanctions suggested a degree of determination to oppose terrorism likely to be reflected
not only in economic sanctions and other measures aimed at state support but also in measures designed to prevent terrorist acts and improve
the procedures for apprehending, extraditing and prosecuting individual
terrorists. 8 5 To some Unmeasurable extent, therefore, sanctions like
these may function to deter even independent terrorists.
Second, the expansion of sanctions communicated a variety of
messages to Syria itself. Here again, they conveyed determination, commitment to the goal of opposing state supported terrorism and an inten-

kinson, Terrorism: The InternationalResponse, 34

WORLD TODAY 5 (1978).
181. See Jenkins, supra note 83, at 10; Kutner, Constructive Notice: A Proposal to
End InternationalTerrorism, 10 Comm. L. LAW 3, at 1, 3. On Soviet supply of weapons-including sophisticated weapons like surface-to-air missiles-see Libyan-Sponsored
Terrorism: A Dilemma for Policymakers, Hearings before Subcomm. on Security and
Terrorism of the Sen. Comm. on Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 77, 92 (1986) (statement of Yonah Alexander).
182. See supra text accompanying note 74. See Bialos & Juster, supra note 15, at
848-49, 852-53.
183. See D. BALDWIN, supra note 66, at 96-114. For a discussion of Baldwin's
work, see Abbott, supra note 19.
184. See D. BALDWIN, supra note 66, at 96-114.
185. For a review of recent United States measures of this type, see Address of Robert B. Oakley, supra note 32.
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tion to take action in support of that goal."' 6 An action like the imposition of sanctions conveys these messages more credibly than mere words
because it demonstrates that the United States is willing to bear costs l8
and to accept risks"8 8 in pursuit of its goals. By imposing sanctions, after
all, the United States loses gains from trade, acquires a reputation as an
unreliable supplier,"8 9 and incurs the risk that Syria will cause harm to
hostages held by terrorist groups it supports, sabotage the Middle East
peace process or use force against Israel or respond in other damaging
ways. Sanctions can also communicate a threat of military action. The
embargo of Libya was clearly designed to convey such a threat; 90 the
sanctions against Syria, in contrast, were not.' 91
Communicating these messages of commitment and action entails clear
dangers, of course. One danger is that the United States may have no
way of making good on its commitments, so that it comes to look foolish. 9 2 Another danger is that the United States will feel forced to escalate, perhaps to otherwise undesirable military action, to avoid looking
foolish. Both of these dangers are real in the Syrian situation, as they
were with Libya.
In fact, however, the Syria sanctions seem to have been designed to
minimize the need for further coercive measures by conveying certain
psychological messages to Syria. American officials, including the President, went out of their way to characterize the sanctions as demonstrating that the support of terrorism was causing Syria to become isolated,

186. See D. BALDWIN, supra note 66, at 102-08. See also State Department Report,
supra note 1, at 1-2 (economic sanctions "demonstrate our resolve," "demonstrate United
States determination to oppose another nation's support of terrorism," and "demonstrate
that we support our policies with actions as well as words."). This report is one of the
best available summaries of the symbolic uses of sanctions.
187. See D. BALDWIN, supra note 66, at 107. See also State Department Report,
supra note 1, at 1-2 (sanctions "demonstrate that we . . . are prepared to incur costs in
our battle against international terrorism," and "show that we are prepared to accept
economic losses, if necessary.")
188. See D. BALDWIN, supra note 66, at 112.
189. See supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text; State Department Report,
supra note 1, at 2.
190. See Bialos & Juster, supra note 15, at 848-49, 852-53.
191. See infra text accompanying note 201.
192. Baldwin sees a similar effect in the League of Nations sanctions against Mussolini's Italy. One goal of the sanctions was to demonstrate to Hitler the League's ability
and will to stand up to aggression. Britain and France, however, were unwilling to go to
war even with Italy, and they clearly communicated this lack of resolve by the manner in
which they implemented sanctions. As a result, the League sanctions did not deter Hitler,
and they have been subject to ridicule ever since. See D. BALDWIN, supra note 66, at
156-58.
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rejected by the "international community of nations" and by the "civilized world."1 ' The government explicitly linked the sanctions, in this
regard, to recent European diplomatic sanctions. The American sanctions themselves included a reduction in the staff of the American embassy and a suspension of high level diplomatic meetings."" Syria, the
White House said, could play an important role in a key region of the
world, but it could not expect to be accepted "as a responsible power or
[treated] as one as long as it continues to use terrorism as an instrument
of its foreign policy."" 95 The United States designed these sanctions, in
short, to apply political and moral pressure as well as economic pressure 9 8 and to play on the concern for reputation
that keeps most states
19 7
from supporting terrorists in the first place.
As suggested previously, some of the new Syria sanctions were relatively weak. The United States did not order its firms to terminate operations in Syria, for example, as it had earlier done with Libya.' Instead, it advised its oil firms that further Syrian oil operations would be
"inappropriate."' 9 9 The moderation of the sanctions communicated still
other messages to Syria, inconsistent to some degree with the basic
messages of opposition and commitment. The use of moderate sanctions
seems to have allowed the United States "to make a commitment, but not
too much of a commitment," and to "deter and reassure simultaneously,"
as economic sanctions are peculiarly suited to do.200
After the message of restraint that the United States conveyed, albeit
not explicitly, was an acknowledgment of Syria's power and influence in
the Middle East. By imposing only moderate sanctions, the United
States made clear that it did not want to provoke a military or political
reaction that might be worse than Syria's support of terrorism.2 0' The
sanctions also conveyed a desire to maintain some lines of communication

193.

White House Statement, supra note 16.

194. See id.
195. Id.
196. See D. BALDWIN, supra note 66, at 134-36. Economic sanctions that convey a
threat of military action, similarly, exert influence through the sanctioning state's military power base, not through economic pressure.
197. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.

198. See Bialos & Juster, supra note 15, at 812-14 (discussing ban on contract performance), 824-25 (discussing hardship exceptions).

199.

White House Statement, supra note 16.

200.

See D.

201.

The Iran hostage crisis was a similar situation. Baldwin believes that the

BALDWIN,

supra note 66, at 102-05.

United States designed the sanctions imposed against Iran to communicate moderation as

well as resolve, so as to ensure the release of the hostages. Id. at 251-52.
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or some possibility of cooperation for mutual interests. °2 By limiting
itself to economic sanctions and by keeping them moderate, the United
States demonstrated that in spite of the Libya bombing a few months
earlier,20 3 it was not trigger-happy; it would act with restraint, relying
on peaceful measures as long as possible. 20 " American officials generally
went out of their way to distinguish Syria from Libya, which they
treated as a special, extreme case.2" 5 The sanctions and related diplomatic measures conveyed a subtle mix of messages to Syria that may
have had the effect the United States desired: as this article was written,
Syria had closed the Damascus office of the Abu Nidal terrorist group
and had made efforts for the release of Western hostages held in Lebanon; the United States had responded by proposing discussions on a variety of Middle East issues.2"'
Third, the Syria sanctions conveyed messages to other states. The
sanctions conveyed the basic message of commitment and determination
indirectly to all other terrorist-supporting states, including the Soviet
Union, and they sent an implicit message of support to all states working
to suppress terrorism. 0 7 The United States almost certainly imposed
only moderate sanctions on Syria to reassure the European allies and

202. See State Department Report, supra note 1, at 3 ("In stark contrast to Libya,
we have been able on occasion to use our relationships with [other countries on the
terrorism list, including Syria] to the benefit of U.S. interests").
203. See supra note 14.
204. The White House statement imposing the sanctions reviewed earlier economic
sanctions against Syria and depicted the new sanctions as additional steps in an orderly
progression. It also linked them explicitly to European Community sanctions imposed a
few days before, which were even more moderate. The statement did, however, say that
additional steps would be taken if necessary. See White House Statement, supra note 16.
205. See State Department Report, supra note 1, at 3 ("Libya is an exceptional case.
There are major qualitative differences between our relationship with Libya and other
countries on the terrorism list. We have normal diplomatic relations with Syria. .. ").
The Western allies have also singled out Libya, at the behest of the United States. See
Tokyo Economic Summit Statement on Terrorism, supra note 30.
206. See N.Y. Times, June 26, 1987, at 5, col. 5. Several European countries had
begun to renew such discussions even earlier; N. Y. TiMEs, Mar. 31, 1987, at 2, col. 1.
207. See State Department Report, supra note 1, at 1 ("Economic sanctions may be
used . . . to strengthen the resolve of others, such as neighboring countries or U.S. allies,
in dealing with governments that support terrorism."). The sanctions are somewhat analogous to the United States embargo of Cuba, which was designed in part to warn the
Soviet Union and its allies of American opposition to Communism in the Western Hemisphere, to reassure and demonstrate support for non-Communist rulers in the hemisphere, and, by analogy to the messages conveyed to terrorist groups, to communicate
opposition and determination to Communist revolutionary groups in Latin America. See
D. BALDWIN, supra note 66, at 176-78.
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other states concerned by the use of military force against Libya 0 8 and
to demonstrate continued American commitment to the use of peaceful
measures and proportionality.20 9 Most broadly, the sanctions helped to
focus the continued attention of all states, indeed all people, on the problem of terrorism.210
Finally, the United States seems to have designed the Syria sanctions
to communicate several specific and important messages to its allies in
Europe, Japan and elsewhere. First, the sanctions demonstrate continuing American leadership on the issue of terrorism.2 11 American officials
have long felt that unilateral measures, like these sanctions and the
Libya embargo, focus attention on the problem and encourage others to
follow the American lead.212 They view the Tokyo Summit declaration
on terrorism213 and other instances of cooperation as products, at least in
2 14
part, of American leadership.
More specifically, as the State Department declared, unilateral sanctions serve "to refute criticisms that we ask our allies to make sacrifices

208.

"Nothing has so vehemently separated America from Europe since 1945."
April 26, 1986, at 13.
209. See State Department Report, supra note 1, at 2 ("[The use of economic sanctions] serves to refute criticisms . . . that we are unwilling to try 'peaceful measures'
before taking other steps;" "Measures that appear unnecessarily harsh or inappropriate
can undermine our credibility with the targeted country as well as with friendly countries whose support we seek.")
210. By analogy, Baldwin observes that the League of Nations sanctions against Italy "began to sensitize the Western democracies to the need to oppose aggression and
may have made it easier to arouse public support in subsequent years." See D. BALDWIN, supra note 66, at 160.
211. The United States made the exercise of leadership much more explicit, however, in imposing the Libyan embargo. See, e.g., National Emergency with Respect to
Libya, supra note 91 ("The United States . . . calls upon other nations to join with us
in isolating the terrorists and their supporters. We must demonstrate . . . that the international community considers such actions intolerable . . . .[E]ach nation must bear its
fair share of the vital effort against the politics of terror. I call upon every nation to do so
now.").
212. See State Department Report, supra note 1, at 1 ("[Imposing costly sanctions]
helps us to encourage others to follow our example and make the required trade and
financial sacrifices.") For an argument that the bombing of Libya also had the aim, and
effect, of catalyzing allied action, see Zilian, The U.S. Raid on Libya-and NATO, 30
ORBIs 499 (1986).
213. The statement both condemned terrorism and explicitly named Libya as a sponsoring state, a major aim of United States policy. See Tokyo Economic Summit Declaration on Terrorism, supra note 30.
214. See State Department Report, supra note 1, at 1, 3 ("[Libyan embargo] may
have contributed to our recent success in obtaining multilateral cooperation, albeit limited, on sanctions and other measures.")
ECONoMisT,
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while we continue to profit from commercial relations with countries
'
supporting terrorism." 215
The criticisms referred to occurred during the
Siberian pipeline episode, when the United States continued to sell grain
to the Soviet Union while asking its allies to forego industrial exports.2 1
The United States intended the Syrian sanctions, like the Libya embargo, to demonstrate that it plans to be more restrained in its use of
extraterritorial trade controls, another lesson learned from the pipeline
case. 217 Finally, the Syrian sanctions sent a powerful message of support
to England, which had just convicted Nizar Hindawi of complicity in the
attempted El Al bombing21 and persuaded the European Community to
adopt diplomatic sanctions against Syria.2" 9 England, of course, had provided a base for the bombing of Libya;22 0 here the United States repaid
the favor.
V.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing analysis has suggested when economic sanctions may be
appropriate measures for dealing with state involvement in international
terrorism and has outlined the functions that sanctions can perform in
that regard. The difficult questions of effectiveness and cost-in general
and in regard to the antiterrorism sanctions actually imposed by the
United States-have not been fully answered here.
One could give complete answers to those questions, if at all, only
after detailed study of particular cases.221 It would also be necessary to
compare other available measures, including diplomatic responses, covert
action, military force and inaction. Often economic sanctions that seem
ineffective or unduly costly when examined in isolation appear more reasonable when compared to the other alternatives.222

215. Id. at 1 ("Openly acknowledging that the United States also will suffer from
sanctions helps us to encourage others to follow our example . . .
216. See D. BALDWIN, supra note 66, at 280.
217. See State Department Report, supra note 1, at 2-3 (pipeline sanctions demonstrated that extraterritorial controls cause friction with friendly countries; United States
has attempted to moderate extraterritorial reach, where appropriate, as with Libya
embargo).
218. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1986, at A4, col. 1.
219. See White House Statement, supra note 16 (linking American sanctions to European Community action).
220. See N.Y. Times, April 16, 1986, at A14, col. 1.
221. For a number of exemplary case studies, see generally D. BALDWIN, supra note
66.
222. See Bialos & Juster, supra note 15, at 849-52 (analyzing options to Libya
embargo).
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The preliminary analysis in this Article suggests, however, that when
one considers all their functions, economic sanctions can play a valuable
role, at least at the margin, in a national strategy against international
terrorism. At the same time, their effects will frequently be small, especially in the short run, while their costs and risks are likely to be substantial. Economic sanctions alone are no cure for international
terrorism.
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APPENDIX
Economic Sanctions and International Terrorism
Figure 1
STATE INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORISM
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direct participation

1987]

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND TERRORISM

Economic Sanctions and International Terrorism
Figure 2
RATIONALES OR STRATEGIES OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

A.

Economic warfare:

withhold gains from trade:

B.

embargo; civilian "bottleneck" items

Imposing costs:
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C.
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Economic Sanctions and International Terrorism
Figure 3

Libya embargo; restrictions on
exports, oil imports, air transportation;
Bonn Declaration

